From: military-radio-guy Full-Name: Dennis R Starks To: military radio collectors#1 Fcc: Sent Date: Fri, 26 Dec 1997 08:41:12 Subject: Military Collector Group Post, Dec.26/97 Message-ID: <19971226.084012.7791.3.military-radio-guy@juno.com> X-Status: Sent X-Mailer: Juno 1.38 Military Collector Group Post, Dec.26/97 Index: TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC; PART IV, BY LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD HUMOR; ************************************************ TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC; PART IV, BY LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD . Specifications for the locations were that it contain housing, messsing, and recreational facilities for approximately 90 officers and 185 enlisted men (72 Technical Intelligence teams), as well as shop space for analysis laboratories for each of the six services, room for the shipping and receiving department, and sufficient ground space for a motor pool and an Ordnance area for heavy equipment. This is typical of the way in which organization locations were selected in the city of Manila after its capture. While driving about the city looking for a suitable location, Major Manley spotted two large warehouses on top of a hill, had to circle twenty-five miles around to find a bridge to cross to the area. The place he had found turned out to be ideal. It was a 500 by 1,000 foot area four and a half miles east of downtown Manila, sufficiently removed from the dust and traffic of the destroyed city to afford privacy. Situated in San Juan Heights, a quiet residential district, the grounds were on one of the highest elevations in Manila. The two three-story warehouses, owned by the Oriental Printing Company, were unoccupied, and adequately housed the analysis laboratories, the shipping and receiving section, the enlisted men's and certain of the officer's quarters. A private home nearby, which previously had been occupied by a Japanese general, looked like an excellent officers club and quarters, but had already been requisitioned for a general of the United States Army. Nevertheless, everything worked out smoothly. When the general found out there would be a traffic of captured guns, tanks, and other heavy equipment being shipped in and out of the Depot close by, he relinquished the house and took another he preferred in another part of town. The house was converted into an attractive officers club and quarters. An enlisted men's recreation club 26 x 72 feet had to be constructed, as well as showers and washing facilities for enlisted men, latrines, a garage 26 x 30 feet in the motor pool, and an outdoor theater. With approval of the War Department, a photographic laboratory was later constructed to handle the requirements of the analysis sections and field teams. The processing of photographs taken by the 72 Technical Intelligence teams at that time assigned to the 5250th, and the preparation of the required number of copies for forwarding to the War Department, were so large a burden on existing theater facilities that they were unable to carry the load. The Technical Intelligence Photographic Laboratory became one of the largest in the theater. Prior to completion of unloading the ship on which Depot Headquarters had arrived it was moved to another location and struck an enemy mine, damaging the hold containing much important shop equipment. This ship, carrying both records and personal gear, was not raised and some of the material was not salvaged until the following October. Upon arrival at Manila, the various sections were assigned space, and commenced construction of necessary facilities. Collection and analysis were continued concurrently with construction despite the loss of the equipment from the ship. Some personnel from the analysis sections of the Depot were pooled during the major portion of May under Capt Walter Schween, who was named assistant company commander under Major Manley pending the completion of all construction projects. Lt Van Slyck, meanwhile, continued as administrative officer. Receipts of enemy equipment at the Depot in Manila consisted of steady flow of captured material from Technical Intelligence Field Units, from the provisional Technical Intelligence Depots in Luzon, from Headquarters Eighth Army, from Philippine bases, and from censorship detachments. Then the laboratory work was again in full swing, arrangements were completed with Fort Command for the handling of shipments of captured material to the United States. Standing operating procedure for the shipping of Intelligence samples, as worked out by Major Manley in conjunction with Chiefs of Services, Headquarters, AFWESPAC, was put into effect at the Technical Intelligence Depot, and initial shipments from the Manila area to the United States were accomplished. Included in these shipments were many new types of equipment not previously analyzed as well as large shipments for training purposes. In accordance with War Department Circular No. 13, 11 January 1945, regarding the shipment of captured material to the United States for Intelligence purposes, reports were made to the theater commander immediately upon recovery of the first, second and third item of Japanese ground force equipment not previously captured, so that this information might be cabled to Washington. As set forth in the British-American Agreement of 15 November 1944 covering captured Japanese Ground Forces equipment and Technical Research, shipments were also made direct to British destinations upon notification by the Director of Military Intelligene, British War Office, through the Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Throughout this period Technical Intelligence information was disseminated to subordinate commands through the media of the "G-2 Weekly Report,"edited and published by the AC of S, G-2, Sixth Army, and the "Technical Intelligence Bulletin," published by G-2, Eighth Army. Technical Intelligence units in the field had access to similar publications originating with and distributed by the various corps G-2 sections. Elaborate displays of representative articles of Japanese equipment with accompanying descriptive reading matter, were prepared by all analysis section chiefs and set up at the Technical Intelligence Depot. Later this complete display was moved down the AFWESPAC Headquarters. A permanent display of Japanese Ordnance was also placed at Ordnance Headquarters, AFWESPAC, as requested by General Holman, Chief Ordnance Officer AFPAC: another permanent exhibit of Japanese equipment, consisting of 33 pieces of Ordnance equipment and 17 pieces of Quartermaster equipment, was issued to the 14th AA Command for a prominent display requested by the Commanding General of the unit; and a third similar exhibit was assembled at GHQ. Also indicative of the training aid given to troops were the thirty special Ordnance kits used during a training program instituted by Replacement Command. These kits, which were of considerable help in familiarizing the troops with Japanese infantry weapons, contained samples of small arms and mortars. By the end of May 1945, Technical Intelligence had secured a comprehensive and fairly detailed knowledge of all technical developments used by the enemy in the Phillippine campaign. Whatever the Japanese had developed that was new in equipment and techniques had been secured, studied, analyzed -- and that information disseminated to United States troops. Quantities of enemy equipment had been captured and were being shipped to the United States for training purposes. Though the Battle of the Philippines continued and thousands of Japs still remained scattered throughout the Islands, to all intents and purposes the mission of Technical Intelligence -- that is, of the men operating directly in the field with the troops -- was drawing to a close. During the following two months, units were gradually withdrawn from the field, returned to headquarters, and staged for the Blacklist Operations. With the "official" conclusion of the Philippine campaign in July, a survey of the results of Technical Intelligence activities from 27 March 1945, when the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot was established in Manila, to July 1945, indicated that 952 new items of Intelligence significance had been recovered in the Philippine Islands campaign. During the same period, over 4,000 nameplates and reproductions were shipped to the Ground Industry Section, Military Intelligence Service, Washington. Also, 244 technical reports were submitted by the analysis sections of the Depot; these covered a wide variety of both new and previousy reported Japanese material of all branches of service and were published and approved by the chiefs of services, AFWESPAC. In June AFPAC forwarded to AFWESPAC the requirements of Sixth Army for Technical Intelligence units for the coming operation. Five type "A" Units, five type "B" Units, one Field Depot Unit -- a total of 52 officers and 107 enlisted men would be needed for coming Sixth Army operations. These requiremnts were incorporated in the logistical instructions issued by AFPAC. Anticipating the Olympic and Coronet Operations on the Japanese mainland, seventy additional officers and one hundred and twenty five enlisted men were requisitioned from the War Department for Technical Intelligence duty in this theater. These figures covered only preliminary Sixth Army requirements. The company was also augmented 1 July by the arrival from New Guinea of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 98th Quartermaster Battalion. The commanding oficer, Major James D. Collie, was made Deputy Commander of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company under Major Manley. The Quartermaster Battalion also furnished office personnel during this period, and was responsible for the company administration. With the return of Technical Intelligence personnel to the Depot in the ensuing months, an extensive training program as a refresher course for these personnel and as an orientation course for the new Technical Intelligence personnel arriving in the theater was established at the Depot under the direction of the senior field officer of each service. The course, based upon practical experience in the field, included lectures, charts, and a complete display of enemy equipment. The seven-day program, which prepared Technical Intelligence personnel for future operations, was opened 18 August with an introductory address by Major Manley and was received with enthusiam. Classes were attended by all personnel present at the depot except those needed for section work. The Medical, Ordnance, and Chemical Warfare analysis section held supplementary specialist training programs for their men and certain personnel also attended a week long ammunition course at MEIU No. 1. At the end of July a request was made to GHQ that authority be granted for a Technical Intelligence pass to be authorized for issue by AFPAC to all Technical Intelligence officers operating in the Pacific theater. Authority was granted, and officers of 5250th were issued Technical Intelligence passes which considerably expedited their work. For some months past, both Col Sauve, G-2 USASOS, and Major Manley, coordinator of Technical Intelligence, had urged the consolidation of all Technial Intelligence activities under the coordinating command at GHQ. Shortly after the activation of the United States Army Forces, Pacific, (AFPAC) they had drafted a complete plan for operation of Technical Intelligence under that headquarters and had submitted it, together with a proposed table of allotments to provide for all personnel at that time on detached service with the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company. Assuming that a separate area command would in due course of time be formed for operations within the Philippines and southward, and pointing out that additional armies coming under AFPAC that would be totally unfamiliar with Technical Intelligence as established in SWPA, they recommended that to minimize confusion delay and duplication of effort, centralized control under AFPAC be established. Their recommendation was temporarily shelved but was later adopted on an even more comprehensive scale. When the atomic bomb suddenly emerged upon the scene, when the was was abruptly ended, and the entire industrial, scientific and technological resources of the Japanese Empire were opened for investigation, centralized control - not only for the United States Army but for all Allied Headquarters - was mandatory. Friday evening, 10 August 1945, around 2100 hours, the Manila radio station, WVTB, broadcast that it had been "unofficially" announced that the Japanese Imperial Government had indicated they would accept the Potsdam peace terms. After the long wait Saturday night, 11 August, the news of the Japanese surrender was officially confirmed in Manila Sunday morning, 12 August. Every plan that had been made for the impending Olympic Operation was suspended. The Armies made a rapid shift of weight from combat force to army of occupation. Technical Intelligence Units were alerted to move to Japan 23 August, necessitating an immediate and tremendous turnover of personnel. Practically all personnel in the field were ordered immediately into the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot. At the same time, arrangements were made to attach additional personnel to the 5250th so that more teams could be organized. Thirty-eight new officer and 58 enlisted men from all branches of service joined the organization during the course of the month. All Technical Intelligence units were equipped and trained and ready to move out on the dates set by General Headquarters. Major construction projects finished during August were new enlisted men and officer mess halls and two buildings originally intended for the Medical analysis section. Crowded conditions in the enlisted men's and officers' quarters caused by the additional personnel reporting in from the field were alleviated by moving approximately 50 enlisted men into the section which formerly served as a mess hall and by using the Medical analysis building as additional officers quarters. With the sudden move to Japan, the enlarged Medical Laboratory was not needed, and construction of a storage warehouse for the Signal analysis section was delayed pending decision on the future status of the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot in the Philippine sector. The movement of a majority of field units to line organizations eliminated quartering of personnel as a problem by the end of August. Preliminary plans for coordination of scientific investigations and Technical Intelligence in connection with ultimate operations were discussed at a conference held early in the month with the Special Scientific Consultant from the War Department, the Pacific Warfare Board, and the Office of the Counter-Intelligence, GHQ. The recommendation that had been made earlier in May by Col. Sauve and Lt. Col Manley (recently promoted) to G-2, General Headquarters that the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), at that time under the control of AFWESPAC should be attached to GHQ for operational control, again came to the fore. A recommendation from Chief Engineer, GHQ, to G-2, GHQ, advising the same set-up, kept the matter open, and at another conference, with G-2 and Chief Engineer, GHQ, in the latter part of August, it became increasingly evident that Technical Intelligence would be able to operate much more effectively out of higher headquarters. It was decided that no action could be taken immediately but that GHQ would arrive at a definite decision in the matter. Little was done about Japanese material in the Philippines at this time, as it was anticipated that all requirements could be met more satisfactorily in Japan and that the problem of Japanese material in the AFWESPAC area would be one of local disposition. Few bookings were placed with Port Command because of a tendency of services involved to stop all shipments until clarification from Washington of material required, due to the change caused by the surrender of Japan. Lt. Col Manley submitted to G-2, GHQ, a draft of recommended regulations to supercede USAFFE Circular 83, 1944, on the disposition of captured enemy material in the Pacific theater. The draft contained receommendation for retention of various items as souvenirs by individual soldiers since hostilities had been terminated. Personnel from ten Field Units and Field Depot Unit were assigned from 5250th to Sixth and Eighth Armies during August as part of the occupation forces for Japan (Blacklist operation). This split between both Armies the T.I. units originally intended for Sixth Army alone. Technical Intelligence target objective folders were published and distributed to the Units as they left the Depot as well as to all corps and divisions under Sixth Army. These folders outlined by areas various targets of interest to Technical and Technological Intelligence on the Islands of Japan. Forms for reporting on Japanese industrial installations were also distributed to the teams. With the war ended, the quantity of new captured enemy equipment received at the Depot during the month was negligible. Analysis of enemy equipment at the Manila depot had ceased by September, except for clearing up 58 reports already under way. All equipment on hand was disposed of as soon as possible. In the month of August 194,080 pounds of enemy material were shipped to the United States by water; 2,020 pounds by air; and 150 pounds by Army courier service. Water bookings during the same period amounted to 97,850 pounds. Air shipment of enemy Ordnance material to Military Intelligence Service, (MIS) United States Army Forces European Theater, Paris, France, left Manila 5 August. Two hundred twenty-eight photographs of captured enemy material were forwarded to Map and Photo Division, (MIS), Washington, D.C., and 283 nameplates and miscellaneous rubbings were sent to Ground Industry Section, MIS, during the same period. Twenty-one copies of compilation on Japanese economic data from the Signal Section were submitted to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFWESPAC, for further distribution to Sixth and Eighth Armies, and additions to the Japanese Chemical Warfare Notebook were sent to the printers. Ordnance material which had been captured aboard the Japanese hospital ship "Techibana Maru" was turned over to the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot to be inventoried, photographed, reported, and retained in storage with its original packaging, pending receipt of instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces Pacific. It was held for use by the War Crimes Branch, AFPAC, for use in possible war crimes trials. Troops that had seized the hospital ship, however, had been allowed to souvenir much of the equipment before Technical Intelligence was notified. Lt. Col Manley had flown to Tokyo before the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company sailed from Manila, to make preliminary arrangements for the transfer of the unit to Japan, since G-2, GHQ, directed that a United States Army Technical Intelligence Center be established at Tokyo Arsenal No. 1, Shimojujo, OJi-ku, Tokyo. The Center was to be administered by the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company with Lt Col Manley as Commanding Officer. The Imperial Japanese Government was notified through the Central Liaison Office, Tokyo (memorandum AG 601 (19 Oct 45) GD, Subject: Acquisition of Certain Facilities of Tokyo Arsenal No. 1, dated 19 October 1945) that buildings 255, 263, 269, 276, 395, 475, 481 and the open areas adjacent to these buildings of the Arsenal would be "made available immedately for occupancy by an agency of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" (GH2, SCAP). The Imperial Japanese Government was directed that all items of supplies, equipment, furniture, furnishings and fixtures would remain in the buildings until a representative of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander to the Allied Powers designated the items required for use by the Allied Forces and those items which might be removed. It was further directed that the Imperial Japanese Government make necessary arrangements to have a representative of their office at building 395 at 1000, 20 October 1945, for a meeting with the representative of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The details pertaining to the work to be accomplished and the installation of the facilities referred to above would be "communicated to your representative at that time." Lt. Col Manley met with the Japanese representatives at the Arsenal 20 October and directed them as to the installation of bathing, sanitary, messing and other facilities which would be required and directed that buildings and grounds requisitioned would be thoroughly cleaned prior to occupancy by the 5250th Technical Intelligence company. The portion of Tokyo Arsenal No. 1 turned over for use as the United States Army Technical Intelligence Center, comprised eight buildings with a total of 157,949 square feet floor space, and a ground area 1000 by 1500 feet square. The main building, which had formerly been used as the administration center for the Tokyo Arsenal, was taken over for administration headquarters for the 5250th. One 3-story building was used for the shipping and receiving section, for company supply, and for the combined Army-Navy library of the Washington Document Center, Advance. One 2-story building was converted into laboratories and offices for the six analysis sections of the Company. One building, part of which was 5 stories high, was used for mess hall, quarters, and recreation center for officers, and a similar building was designated for similar use for enlisted men. A large warehouse was utilized as garage and motor pool, where all vehicles could be stored indoors. The seventh building was a theater for company personnel. Another building, which housed two scientific laboratories with testing equipment intact, was taken over in addition to the seven previously requisitioned and was available for use by technical personnel for analysis of Intelligence samples of Japanese material. Upon his return to Manila, Lt Col Manley appointed Lt Col Sullo, Majors Madigan and Hirst, and Capt Shaw as forward echelon to fly to Tokyo to complete arrangements for the arrival of the Company. They arrived 26 October and supervised the clearance of the buildings and had the premises set up so that when the ships with the balance of the Company aboard docked in Tokyo Bay the Arsenal was ready for occupancy. After the Company sailed from Manila, Lt Col Manley flew to Tokyo, leaving Capt Mary A. Chave, Assistant Coordinator of Technical Intelligence, and Lt Edwin A. Kurtz, Assistant Administrative Officer, as rear echelon for the organization. They followed 22 November. In a conference with G-1, G-2, and G-3, GHQ, in regard to the transfer of the Technical Intelligence Company from AFWESPAC to GHQ, it had been recommended that the personnel be assigned to GHQ, Special Troops, and it was suggested as desirable to preserve the entity of the organization in its name, "5250th", the number assigned it under the orders establishing the organization as a Separate, (Provisional) Company under USASOS. AFPAC assigned the company to Special Troops, General Headquarters Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, upon their departure from Manila. General Orders 337, General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific, dated 20 November 1945, established the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company as a theater overhead installation and stated that grades and ratings would be authorized by separate communication. General Order 369, same headquarters, dated 30 Nov 45, dissolved the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional). By letter order AG 32003 (29 Nov 45) GA, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Subject; Allotment of Theater Overhead Grades and Strength, dated 29 November 1945, allotment of theater overhead grades and ratings was made to the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company with a total strenght of 261 people. Occupation Instructions No. 2, Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated 25 September 1945, outlined to the occupation forces for Japan the general instructions governing the collection and disposition of enemy equipment of the Japanese armed forces. This was the broad outline. The disposition of enemy equipment collected for Intelligence purposes was governed by later directives. General Orders No. 9, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Subject: Japanese Military Intelligence Targets, dated 2 October 1945 designated the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, to coordinate and supervise the exploitation of the military intelligence targets in Japan and Korea. Under this General Order, the exploitation of targets and objectives included coordination and utilization of certain general and technical Intelligence agencies: the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company, including the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot and field unit personnel; Translator Interpreter Service (TIS, a revised ATIS organization) Combined Document Center and field detachments; special staff sections responsible for the technical supervision of their respective Technical sections in the 5250th, including laboratory and field teams; Air Corps and Navy technical units analogous to the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company; and special technical missions, national and foreign. Coordinating control and supervision over the various agencies interested in Technical Intelligence investigations were exercised through normal command and staff channels. These agencies included special staff sections of AFPAC Armies, separate Corps, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Far Eastern agencies, and special missions represented in Japan and Korea. Each of these agencies designated plenary representatives to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, who operated under his control and whose mission was to coordinate and supervise Technical Intelligence activities to prevent competitive duplication of effort. Technical Intelligence in the Pacific theater was designed to accomplish the following objectives: First, the exploitation of material, including the examination and evaluation of available enemy material and deduction, from this evaluation, of the state of Japanese resources for war. Intelligence so obtained was exploited for the reciprocal benefit of the United States and Allied Armed Forces. This included examination of Japanese facilities which might be involved in the production of material for war and the provision of trained personnel to assist the chiefs of services (Ground, Naval and Air) in the supervision of the collection, safeguarding the evacuation of captured enemy equipment for Intelligence study and for tactical and training purposes. Second objective of Technical Intelligence in the Pacific was the exploitation of documents. This involved providing trained personnel to screen and inventory enemy documents; circulating accession results, that is lists of documents received, to authorized agencies; extracting Intelligence needed for security and control by means of fragmentary translations or photostats; selecting military, technical, scientific and general documents for transmission to the United States pertaining the current target books published by the War and Navy Departments and the specific interests of specialist agencies; and, finally, focusing all field agencies of Ground, Naval and Air Forces through TIS for document activity. Third objective of Technical Intelligence was the exploitation of Order of Battle Intelligence and related subject: This involved lists of all regular units (Ground, Naval and Air) lists of code names and numbers, T/O's and T/E's of all types of units; lists of divisions, brigades and major units of Ground, Naval and Air Forces by components, strength, armanent, etc; lists of recruiting districts and units trained therein; lists of Army and Navy officers and their commands, including directories of transfers and promotions, biographies and service records; histories of major units; investigations of recruiting and training systems, of Home Guard and Volunteer Defense Units; investigations of military police, together with records of special and secret service organizations, (Tokumu Kikan); investigations of military intelligence agencies, including histories, operations, etc; and, finaly, reports on military societies. Fourth objective of Technical Intelligence was exploitation of historical records and official reports of the Japanes General Staff (Ground, Naval and Air). This included the organization of Japan for war, the preparatins for the War of 1941, campaigns in the Southwest Pacific Area from 1942 to 1944, campaigns in the Philippines from 1941 to 1942, second campaign in the Philippines in 1945, campaigns in the Pacific islands from 1941 to 1945, and campaigns in other areas from 1941 to 1945. For effective coordination, the following policy provisions were enforced: To prevent competitive duplication, all foreign and national technical missions upon arrival were registered with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, who notified the occupation authorities concerned: G-2, GHQ, conducted all liaison with the Japanese Governmental authorities relative to the operation of technical missions, delegating such liaison as was required to occupation force commanders; since Intelligence targets were geographically distributed, the occupation force commanders were responsible for the coordination of exploitation of targets within their territorial jurisdiction, operating through subordinate commanders or staffs to prevent competitive duplications. To expedite the conduct of these investigations, G-2, GHQ, was authorized to correspond directly with the heads of the various interested agencies previously mentioned or their representatives on technical details, and direct correspondnece between plenary representatives and the heads of the agencies they represented was authorized. To protect Intelligence THE WILLIAM L. HOWARD ORDNANCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM e-mail wlhoward@gte.net Telephone AC 813 585-7756 ************************************************ HUMOR; Hooked On Ebonics Leroy is a 20 year old 9th grader. This is Leroy's homework assignment. He must use each vocabulary word in a sentence. 1. Foreclose - If I pay alimony this month, I have no money foreclose. 2. Rectum - I had two cadillacs, but my old lady rectum both. 3. Hotel - I gave my girlfriend crabs and the hotel everyone. 4. Disappointment - My parole officer told me if I miss disappointment they gonna send me back to da big house. 5. Penis - I went to a doctor and he handed me a cup and said penis. 6. Israel - Alonso tried to sell me a Rolex. I said, man that looks fake. He said bullshit. That watch Israel. 7. Catacomb - Don King was at the fight the other night. Man, somebody oughta give that catacomb. 8. Undermine - That is a fine looking hoe living in the apartment undermine. 9. Acoustic - When I was liddle, my uncle bought me accustic and took me to da pool hall. 10. Iraq - When we go to da pool hall, I tol my uncle Iraq, you break. 11. Stain - My mother-in-law stopped by and I axed her do you plan on stain for dinner? 12. Seldom - My cousin gave me two tickets to the Knicks game, so I seldom. 13. Honor - At the rape trial, the Judge axed my buddy, who be honor first. 14. Odyssey - I tol my brother, you odyssey the tits on that hoe. 15. Axe - The policeman wanted to axe me some questions. 16. Tripoli - I was gonna buy my old lady a bra for her birthday, but I couldn't find a Tripoli. 17. Fortify - I axed the hoe how much? She said fortify. 18. Income - I just got in bed with da hoe and income my wife. --------- End forwarded message ---------- When finished reading use browser back button or go to http://www.prc68.com/MCGP/MCGP.html