From: military-radio-guy Full-Name: Dennis R Starks To: military radio collectors#2 Fcc: Sent Date: Tue, 23 Dec 1997 08:38:04 Subject: Military Collector Group Post, Dec.23/97 Message-ID: <19971223.083705.4511.1.military-radio-guy@juno.com> X-Status: Forwarded X-Mailer: Juno 1.38 Military Collector Group Post, Dec.23/97 Index: TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC; PART II, BY LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD Military Radio Trivia; by Hue Miller, & Dennis Starks HUMOR; ******************************************** TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC; PART II, BY LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD CWS Intelligence Team No. 3, covered the Nassau Bay operations for CWS. Air transportation from Brisbane was obtained by the team on 25 June to Port Moresby, thence across the Owen Stanley Range to Dobodura, near Oro Bay. Here the team was attached to the Chemical Section, Headquarters 41st Infantry Division, and spent two weeks going through the old battlegrounds in the Buna -- Gona area where they contacted the men who had taken part in the action and who were at this time established in defensive positions along the beach (the operations had "closed" 22 January ...). The team was then attached to the McKechie Force and sailed on 12 July for Morobe and later on up to Nassau Bay. On 22 July, their mission was completed and they departed and escorted captured material to the rear. On 4 September 1943 under cover of heavy air and naval bombardment, a large Australian force landed and established beachheads fifteen miles northeast of Lae, cutting the enemy's line of communications to Finschhafen and the north coast of New Guinea. On the following day, preceded by heavy bombing and strafing, the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment parachuted and captured the airfield at Nadzab ( a few miles northwest of Lae). Airborne troops were quickly moved in, and following a rapid advance by both forces, Lae fell to the allies on 16 September 1943. Meanwhile, Salamaua had fallen on 11 September and the remnants of four Japanese divisions, half-starved and malaria ridden, were pursued back east along the coast toward Morobe, bitterly contesting every Allied gain. A team of one officer and two EM operated with the Australian forces. When the operation was over they returned to headquarters, USAFFE for duty with another field team. The team salvaged all Japanese Ordnance material of interest in the area, totaling about 60 tons of weapons (including fifty pieces of artillery) and ninety tons of ammunition. Lae -- Salamaua was the most productive of enemy Ordnance equipment up to the Hollandia operation. It was reported that there were also large quantities of Chemical Warfare equipment stored in the Salamaua -- Lae area. On 8 September orders were issued attaching Chemical Warfare Intelligence Team No. 1, to the 5th Australian Infantry Division, which was operating in the Salamaua area. It was not thought, however, at this time, that Lae would fall in the near future, and it was anticipated that Team No. 1 would be able to cover the Salamaua area first and then proceed to Lae. In the event that Lae fell prior to the completion of the Salamaua mission, arrangements were made for CWS Intelligence Team No. 2 to proceed to Lae immediately. During September 1943 operations around Lae were intensified and with the greater part of the available transport planes being used to fly in troops and supplies, transportation for CWS Intelligence Team No. 1 was delayed and they did not arrive in Dobodura until 16 September. Upon arrival, they reported to the United States liaison officer, 1st Australian Corps. It was learned that Lae had fallen that very day and a message was sent, suggesting that CWS Team No 2 proceed there at once. Meanwhile, considerable quantities of enemy Chemical Warfare equipment were found throughout the area by Team No.1. After an air raid alarm on the morning of the 20th September, CWS Team No.2, took off from Ward Drome, Port Moresby, and flew to Nadzab, the closest point to Lae. Upon landing, they reported to the 7th Australian Division which was located a short distance from the field. There, arrangements were made for them to report to 26th Australian Brigade, located in Lae. While they were awaiting transportation to Lae, nine Japanese bombers came over, but mistaking them for friendly planes, no one paid any attention until the anti-aircraft guns opened up over the field. After all this delay transportation was finally secured to Lae. Capt Forcyth of Advanced Allied Translator and Interpreter section was there with a Japanese interpreter. Lt Brown of Mobile Explosives Investigating Unit (MEIU) United States Navy, was contacted, and also Lt White, who had been transferred with Sgt Bruner from the Ordnance Analysis Section to Ordnance Technical Intelligence, Fifth Air Force. Shortly after arrival, the team was transferred from the 26th Australian Brigade to Headquarters 23d Port Detachment, where transportation facilities were more available. After collecting samples of all the Japanese equipment found in the area, the team departed on the 25th of September for Salamaua where they met CWS Team No. 1. This team planned to proceed to Lae and from there to Finschhafen as soon as it should fall. All captured equipment collected by CWS Team No. 1 in the Salamaua area was flown by plane from Salamaua back to Dobodura. On 26 September, transportation by water was obtained to Lae, and Headquarters for CWS Team No. 1 was set up with the 23d Port Headquarters. After a two-day wait for air transportation, the team left for Port Moresby with the equipment collected at Lae and Salamaua. By this time the cleaning up of Lae had progressed considerably. As at Salamaua, it was again evident that the Japanese had evacuated the area is great haste. Large quantities of documents, ammunition and equipment had been left undestroyed. In a coordinated land, sea and air movement an Australian force moved around the coast from Lae and under cover of heavy air and naval bombardment, landed and established beachheads six miles north of Finschhafen on 22 September 1943. The speed of the double development of Lae and Finschhafen apparently had caught the enemy by surprise. Fierce fighting followed the Allied landing, and in the latter stages of the operation many hundreds of Japs died of starvation, wounds and sickness. The capture of Finchhafen insured Allied control of Huon Gulf, and dislocated the enemy's grip on British New Guinea. On 2d October, the CWS Team was notified that Finchhafen had been occupied and arrangements for transportation to that area were made immediately. After landing at the wrong beachhead (which was within five hundred years of the Japanese position), the team hitch-hiked through the jungle to Finschhafen, six miles away. Here they attached themselves to a Company of the 13th Battalion, 20th Australian Brigade, which was in charge of salvaging enemy equipment in that area. After recovering all available enemy Chemical Warfare equipment the team left Finschhafen and returned to Lae and then back to Nadzab, Dobodura, Port Moresby and finally to Brisbane. On 29 September 1943, all Ordnance personnel were transferred by USAFFE to USASOS, and in late October plans were made by USASOS to provide for a Technical Intelligence Depot consisting of five sections: The original two, Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service, and in addition, Quartermaster, Medical and Transportation. No detachment was formed, however, for the entire set-up was changed by USAFFE directive, Subject; "Responsibility of Technical Intelligence", dated 22 December 1943. By this directive, the responsibility for ground Technical Intelligence within the United States Army Forces in the Far East was delegated to the Commanding General, USASOS. He was directed to appoint qualified officers to serve as United States Army representatives on the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board, to provide necessary officer and enlisted personnel to operate the United States Captured Enemy Equipment Depot and to furnish Technical Intelligence personnel both officer and enlisted for inclusion in task force Intelligence teams, USAFFE USASOS. Technical Intelligence operations in SWPA had, in the past, been carried on by detachments of special staff sections operating under varying arrangements in regard to assignment of personnel and supervision of activities. In order to provide an efficient basis for operations of the various Technical Intelligence detachments, USASOS, G-2 Sauve; submitted a proposed plan of operation with a recommended T/O and T/E that included, for the first time, the six major services, (all except Transportation Corps) and that was estimated to be adequate for Theater needs, and recommended that a Technical Intelligence Composite company be activated. This proposal was forwarded to Commanding General USAFFE on 7 December 1943. It was felt that the suggested organization would give more satisfactory Technical Intelligence coverage since it included the six services, that it would make possible the necessary flexibility of operation and movement of personnel which was considered essential for the efficient functioning of the sections, and would enable the formation of well trained and balanced Technical Intelligence teams. Under this arrangement, the several Technical Intelligence sections would be able to facilitate the collection and rapid dissemination of Technical Intelligence information. It would also enable them to control the distribution of captured enemy equipment according to technical and training needs in the Theater and in the United States. On 3 January 1944, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite company, Separate (Provisional) was organized as a provisional company by General Orders No. 2, Headquarters USASOS, so that assignment of personnel could be made and operations continued. T/O and T/E previously suggested to USAFFE, were used as guides, with personnel carried on detached service from source units. The formation of a separate Technical Intelligence Composite Company other than provisional was not favorably considered by USAFFE. On 20 January 1944, Chiefs of Services were directed to furnish qualified personnel for assignment on detached service to 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, separate (Provisional) "to enable the accomplishment of the Technical Intelligence mission". The transfer of personnel to the 5250th was effected by the six services concerned by February 1944. The principle of having a coordinating unit for Technical Intelligence proved highly satisfactory in the coming months of the war. Centralized control made it possible for teams from the six services to function as one unit, thus enabling them to aid each other during the first days of an operation when speed was important. Information, documents and equipment could be collected for all branches by all teams, and this equipment assembled in a central spot where it could be sorted and evaluated by the individual service team concerned. Coordination provided flexibility, made for greater ease and efficiency in matter of command, and eliminated the question concerning responsibility and scope of authority. Most important of all, coordination made it possible for the command to field adequately equipped teams formed and trained in time for all operations and assured complete coverage by Technical Intelligence. There was one very definite drawback, however -- the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company was established only as a provisional organization. This in certain ways, complicated its administration, left its personnel still occupying T/O vacancies in units which they had never worked, made it generally impossible to secure well earned and long deserved promotions, and because the company operated on only a quasi-accepted basis, sometimes ham-strung its efforts when it could have been most effective. Nevertheless, under the direction of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), a comprehensive view of Japanese capabilities was secured and Technical Intelligence centered the period when the work of past years brought in positive results. It was a big step forward. The 5250th was composed of a coordination and administration section, and a technical section for each of the six major services. Each Technical section, composed of laboratory and enemy equipment Intelligence teams, operated under the technical supervision of the Chief of Service and under the general supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 USASOS. Duties, as originally outlined in the recommendation to USAFFE, were followed with only minor modification. The Company Headquarters conducted administration of the Company and coordination of the activities of the several sections. In addition the Company commander was placed on duty in the Office of the AC of S, G-2 , USASOS, as Coordinator of Technical Intelligence. Major Johnston, Ord, in addition to his other duties, was appointed informally as temporary (without orders) commanding officer of the Company and G-2 Technical Intelligence Coordinator. In addition, one officer was on duty in the Office of the AC of S, G-2, USASOS, to conduct Technical Intelligence liaison with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section SWPA. This responsibility was first delegated to Lt Col Jones, Chief Engineer Intelligence officer, and was later turned over to his assistant, Lt Girard R. Lowrey. There was also a Service Technical Intelligence Officer assigned to each staff section. His duties were to advise the Chief of Service on Intelligence matters, to supervise Intelligence activities for the particular service, including training, collection, recording, storage and disposition of captured enemy materia, to collaborate with the Technical Intelligence sections of other services, and to review and issue reports on captured enemy material, installations and procedures, and to forward such information to their respective Chiefs of Service in Washington, D.C. One of the major elements of the company was the Administrative and Analysis Unit. Originally, only the Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal sections operated analysis laboratories under the Chief of the Intelligence Section of the service concerned. Chemical Warfare Service continued to have its analysis work carried on at the 42d Chemical or Victoria Munitions Supply Laboratories, and Engineer and Medical Corps had no teams in the field until the Hollandia operation in April 1944. Laboratories for all the services were established after that. All Technical Intelligence sections, however, maintained administrative divisions, which, within the scope of their activities; advised the Chief of Service on Intelligence matters, coordinated and supervised Intelligence activities, planned, supervised, and correlated Intelligence training activities, established and maintained intelligence liaison, and collaborated with the Technical Intelligence sections of other arms and services and Allied Forces within the Theater, maintained adequate liaison with the Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief of Service, interpreted, evaluated and disseminated Intelligence information as prescribed and, in addition carried on adequate and necessary document research. They supervised the collection, recording, processing, storage and disposition of captured enemy material, obtained data on operational performance of captured enemy material, maintained a file of all reports and data available on Technical Intelligence, and reviewed and issued reports on captured enemy material, installations, procedure, etc. They also arranged for the shipment of selected items of captured enemy material to the United States for training and other purposes, as required. They also kept current, and submitted inventories of captured enemy equipment available to the service in the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot or service laboratories, or enroute to that depot, or in the advance areas, prepared preliminary training manuals on the use of captured enemy equipment, installations, etc., and assisted in planning a training program for United States personnel. The third major element of the company were the Field Teams. These teams collected and forwarded technical combat information through G-2 of the task force to which they were assigned, arranged for the collection and forwarding of captured enemy equipment to the Service Chief for further analysis or to the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot or shipment to the United States, assisted and advised G-2 and the appropriate service officer of the task force on all matters of Technical Intelligence. They investigated reports of the use of new methods, weapons, or tactics, and submitted reports thereon through G-2 of the task force, made preliminary examination of, and reported on enemy equipment captured by the task force. They cooperated with Technical Intelligence personnel of other services and Allied forces and also assisted in interrogation of prisoners of war when requested to do so. They also collected information regarding enemy installations, and prepared reports thereon for forwarding, arranged for the salvage of bulk supplies and material, submitted reports on captured enemy material forwarded to the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot, and maintained current inventories of captured enemy material. A fourth major sub-element was the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot, which operated directly under the supervision of the Chief, Quartermaster Intelligence Section. They received, classified and maintained stock record accounts on all captured enemy equipment forwarded to the Depot and delivered selected items of captured enemy equipment to the appropriate service or force upon authority received from the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board. They packed and shipped to the United Stated selected items of captured enemy equipment, as directed, and prepared and kept current an inventory of captured enemy equipment and a record of the source and distribution of these items to be forwarded through channels at the proper time. A monthly report was prepared containing a list of captured enemy equipment forwarded to the United States during the month, and returned or forwarded to individuals for souveniring such items as were released on the certificate of the AC of S, G-2, USASOS, or other authorized agencies. On 19 February 1944, a directive was received by Headquarters, USASOS, from the Commanding General, USAFFEE, to the effect that photographs, prints, rubbings and drawings of all nameplates or nameplate data from all captured enemy equipment would be forwarded to that Headquarters. The collection of nameplates and rubbings became one of the main missions of Technical Intelligence personnel. They were to send in literally thousands of these items during the coming months of war, and from information based on their translation (names, dates, etc.) Japanese manufacturers of war material were identified and located -- information that was important in determining air raid targets and in studying the enemy's economic status. Greater emphasis was also placed on analysis of captured equipment as an additional factor for the determination of the enemy's economic position. Sound deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war could be based on evidence obtained from a laboratory analyses of captured material. Technical reports included, when possible, conclusions, positive or negative, as to the enemy's economic status. These conclusions were based on a comparison of material and workmanship of recently and previously captured equipment. When such changes were noted, these items were returned to the United States for further laboratory analysis. In February 1944 Major Johnston, accompanied by one officer from each of the other six services and 1st Lt James E. Shelby, QMC, proceeded to advanced areas to inform base sections and army troops that as each of the six services were interested in material, all captured Japanese equipment was desired and should be forwarded. At the same time he informed personnel of the modification of the regulation that facilitated legitimate souveniring. (It was hoped that this would encourage troops to turn in captured equipment, though it turned out that it had little effect on the willful looting and destruction of enemy dumps.) Major Johnston also informed forward echelons of the procedure necessary for shipment of captured material. In December 1943 a request had been sent to G-2, USAFFE, to arrange with Sixth Army to have a combined Technical Intelligence Field Unit participate in the Cape Gloucester operation. However, after receiving permission from Sixth Army, the unit upon arrival at Finschhafen was not allowed to go forward. An officer and two enlisted men, however, did secure permission to go on the Saidor operation 2 January 1944, though the combined unit was not used. Lt. Bishop, T/4 Winn and CPL Beveridge, who had been the men assigned, had operated as an Ordnance Intelligence Team with the 32d Division since 20 October 1943, participated on this and minor operations up the New Guinea coast. From information secured, the team prepared a small booklet as an amplification of the Allied Land Force Headquarter's pamphlet on Japanese equipment. They also assisted in the staging program of the 32d Division on Goodenough Island, instructing the troops on booby traps and enemy Ordnance material. It was found more and more that such training of combat troops in use of Japanese weapons, especially small arms and machine guns, was of considerable value to the task force. The invasion of the Admiralty Islands, specifically Momote Airstrip on Los Negros, was begun 29 February 1944, when the enemy was caught completely off guard in a surprise landing. The campaign marked the final stage in the great swinging movement, pivoting on New Guinea, which had been the basic plan of operations in the Southwest Pacific. Men of the First Cavalry Division landed on Manus Island about one and a half miles northwest of Lorengau, on 15 March. They were covered by artillery fire from small neighboring islands seized the day before, and were supported by destroyers, P.T. boats and air bombardment. Brushing aside the initial light opposition, the force divided, one group heading toward the airstrip, the other branching off to the south. Within three days after their landing on Manus Island United States Cavalrymen captured Lorengau airstrip, and on 18 March they stormed their way into Lorengau town. They then had occupied all vital areas in the Admiralty Islands. The chief prize of the Admiralty victory was Sea Eagle Harbor, which had 55 miles of protected waterway formed by a lagoon of several islands and reefs. It and the two strategic airstrips at Lorengau on Manus Island and Momote on Los Negros, formed a potential base for intensive operations against the remaining enemy strongholds in New Britain and New Ireland. As originally planned in November 1943, and attempted for Cape Gloucestor, Technical Intelligence field operations were to be based on the principle of assigning a field unit composed of one officer and two enlisted men each to a Counter Intelligence team for each task force. This provided for collection and investigation of enemy material at the earliest possible moment after combat operations had begun. In accordance with this plan it was decided that a combined Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service unit should accompany the 1st Cavalry Division in the Admiralties campaign. (The other operations until the Hollandia operation in April 1944). A Counter Intelligence, Corps (CIC) officer was to be in charge of the unit and consolidated reports were to be forwarded covering Counter Intelligence, Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Naval Mobile Explosive Investigation Unit (MEIU) No. 1 activities. Captured documents were to be forwarded to Allied Translator and Interpreter Section. The CIC team consisted of one officer, and eight enlisted men. Technical Intelligence personnel consisted of one officer, and two enlisted men, of the Ordnance Section; one officer, and two enlisted men, of the Chemical Warfare Intelligence Section. Also as part of the unit were one Naval officer, Lt Bushnell, and one enlisted man from MEIU No. 1. The group was organized and fully equipped by G-2, USAFFE, before being sent to join the 1st Cavalry Division. Lt Frederick was placed in command of all personnel, including Technical Intelligence. They functioned as a unit with success during the entire Admiralty Islands campaign. Lt Frederick and Sgt Anderson (CIC), Lt Bushnell, MEIU (Navy), and Lt Henry (CWS) and Sgt Lischalk (Ord) composed the first section of the unit to leave for the Admiralties. They were attached to the S2 of the 12th Cavalry Regiment to accompany them to Los Negros where they were to reinforce the 5th Cavalry Regiment, then in combat. The departure was delayed for two days THE WILLIAM L. HOWARD ORDNANCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM e-mail wlhoward@gte.net Telephone AC 813 585-7756 ******************************************** Military Radio Trivia; "Holocaust", TV movie, has DKE ( 'People's Radio' ) on shelf behind desk in barracks "Cross of Iron" ( ca. 1979 ) has Torn Eb in barracks, being operated without power supply unit. has Fud2 operated in field without power supply unit and operated in makeshift telegraph mode -- technically very unlikely, to be generous. "Das Boot" ( ca 1980 ) has R3 receiver (small) in radio operator's cubicle. hue miller Raeder Rollen Fuer Den Sieg ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- What about "Kelly's Heros"? BC-1000 in bell tower talking to BC-611 on the ground. BC-1306 shot to hell by friendly aircraft, mass of wires hanging out the front. Had more wire hanging out of it than the whole Jeep's wireing harness contained. "Big Red One"? BC-611's by friendly troops, HT-1's in canvas bags by the bad guys. Ancient "Outer Limits"? URC-4 painted silver, used by space aliens. And lest we forget "Combat"? These guys always had a trusty BC-611 around with a 2ft antenna. Current Cable Series on Detachment 101? an SSTR-1 thats really a PRC-1.(if Detachment 101 had an SSTR-1 at all, it was as they were pulling out headed for home. 12 oclock High? I wounder what their T-17's were hooked to? Time Life Books, Secret War? Navajo Code Talkers using a TBY with no battery box, or power supply. Dennis ****************************************************** HUMOR; A guy is on a business trip in Houston and buys a really cool pair of snakeskin boots. He can't wait to show his new boots to his wife. Upon returning from his trip late the next evening, his wife is in the bathroom getting ready for bed. He quickly strips down naked except for his new snakeskin boots and stands in the bedroom to wait for her. As the wife emerges from the bathroom her husband asks, "Well honey, do you notice anything special?" to which the wife replies, "Yeah, it's limp!" "It's not limp!" exclaims the husband. " It's admiring my new snakeskin boots!" "Next time buy a hat." --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When Apollo Mission Astronaut Neil Armstrong first walked on the moon, he not only gave his famous "one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind" statement but followed it by several remarks, usual comments about traffic between him, the other astronauts and Mission Control. Just before he re- entered the lander, however, he made the enigmatic remark "Good luck Mr. Gorsky." Many people at NASA thought it was a casual remark concerning some rival Soviet Cosmonaut. However, upon checking, there was no Gorsky in either the Russian or American space programs. Over the years many people questioned Armstrong as to what the "Good luck Mr. Gorsky" statement meant, but Armstrong always just smiled. Just last year, (on July 5, 1995 in Tampa Bay FL) while answering questions following a speech, a reporter brought up the 26 year old question to Armstrong. This time he finally responded. Mr. Gorsky had finally died and so Neil Armstrong felt he could answer the question. When he was a kid, he was playing baseball with a friend in the backyard. His friend hit a fly ball which landed in the front of his neighbor's bedroom windows. His neighbors were Mr. & Mrs. Gorsky. As he leaned down to pick up the ball, young Armstrong heard Mrs. Gorsky shouting at Mr. Gorsky. "Oral sex! You want oral sex?! You'll get oral sex when the kid next door walks on the moon!" ------------------------------------------------------------------- A snowbird couple went to movie in a small FL town. It was a real tearjerker w/some comedy thrown in. When their eyes became adjusted to the dim light, they realized that the man in the row in front of them was holding a small dog in his lap. When the movie scene was sad the little dog would whine & cry softly & when a funny bit came on, the dog would sit up & quietly bark, in appreciation. After the movie was over, the wife remarked to the dog owner that she was amazed at the dog's appropriate responses to the movie plot. The dog owner said, "I'm surprised, also. He didn't like the book at all!" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- When finished reading use browser back button or go to http://www.prc68.com/MCGP/MCGP.html