From: military-radio-guy Full-Name: Dennis R Starks To: military radio collectors#1 Fcc: Sent Date: Wed, 24 Dec 1997 06:10:16 Subject: Miliyary Collector Group Post, Dec.24/97 Message-ID: <19971224.060909.11095.2.military-radio-guy@juno.com> X-Status: Sent X-Mailer: Juno 1.38 Miliyary Collector Group Post, Dec.24/97 Index: TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC; PART III, BY LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD MYSTERY RADIO; Navy AMA, by Dennis Starks HUMOR; ********************************************** TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC; PART III, BY LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD Admiralty Islands campaign. Lt Frederick and Sgt Anderson (CIC), Lt Bushnell, MEIU (Navy), and Lt Henry (CWS) and Sgt Lischalk (Ord) composed the first section of the unit to leave for the Admiralties. They were attached to the S2 of the 12th Cavalry Regiment to accompany them to Los Negros where they were to reinforce the 5th Cavalry Regiment, then in combat. The departure was delayed for two days and during this time Lt Henry assisted in preparing a geographic survey of Los Negros to be used by the regiment. The information thus obtained proved invaluable on later patrols. The group departed from Cape Sudest, New Guinea, so as to arrive at Hyane Harbor, Los Negros, on the 6th of March, (D plus 6). Although the crisis of the operation had passed, the area cleared by the troops was yet very small. This enabled the team to arrive at captured equipment and material dumps before they had been pillaged and souvenired. Lt Henry and Sgt Lischalk joined the 1st Cavalry Division Headquarters at Sea Eagle Harbor. The top ranking officers of the Division were interested in Technical Intelligence, were anxious that the team should start immediately, and saw to it that it was provided with necessary equipment. During subsequent action, material and documents were received in great quantities, and cooperation from the line units and indivisdual soldiers was splendid. They gave information as to the location of dumps and brought in quantities of material. The lectures and demonstrations that had been given to the troops on the value of enemy equipment for Intelligence purposes paid high dividends. On 9 March, Lt Cemeron and Sgt Loveless arrived. A collection dump was organized and the first bulk shipment of captured material was shipped from Hyane Harbor. The remainder of the detachment arrived on 16 March. One EM was immediately utilized in following the assault back of Papitalai where a Chemical dump had been reported. Another EM was kept busy with photographic work for the detachment and Division G-2. Both men wee subsequently used on patrols, and continued with the unit until the end of the campaign. The dumps located consisted of weapons, ammunition, quartermaster items, and medical supplies of all kinds. Many small dumps were located a few yeards off the trail, protected and camouflaged by canvas, grass, or metal roofing. Each dump was usually of one class of supplies such as clothing, medical supplies or one type of ammunition. Chemical Warfare protection equipment and munitions were found in this sector. By October 1944, by means of island hopping, the United States Forces were ready to embark on the Philippine Campaign. By this time, knocking out pillboxes and isolated strong ponts had been developed into a science, the science of fighting a new type of warfare. Storming the beaches was also far from new, far behind the doughfeet lay such campaigns as Buna, Lae, Hollandia, Biak and many others. Some had been bloody and discouraging but a big job had been completed with exceedingly meager resources. With the Philipines in sight, the picture was completely changed. This time the United States Army had the men and the material, as well as the determination to carry the war through to a successful conclusion. The 13th of October 1944 saw a gigantic two-pronged convoy of 600 transports, landing craft and warships moving northward from Hollandia and westward from the Admiralties. Aboard were troops of the Sixth Army, the X and XXIV Corps. The group was escorted by air and sea by units of the Far East Air Force and the RAAF and elements of the United States Third and Seventh Fleets. General MacArthur was in personal command of the armada that was to make good the promise, "I shall return". On 17 October, the 6th Ranger Battalion struck the opening blow when they seized two islets guarding the entrance to Layte Gulf and on the morning of 20 October, unloading began on four beachheads along Leyte's east coast. Before the finish of the operatin, enemy forces on the island had risen to 150,000, including reinforcements brought in from the other islands. However, the initial attack was so overwhelming that Tacloban, Leyte, was captured with a loss of less than a dozen men and in less than two weeks the United States forces held two-thirds of the island of Leyte. On the morning of 20 October at 0600 hours, the naval bombardment of Leyte began. From 0600 hours until 0900 hours the battleships and cruisers fired approximately 2600 tons of explosives on that island. At 0900 hours, while the heavy units still continued their bombardment, the rocket launching LCI's moved up for the final blow before the actual assault troops began landing. They went in abreast of each other in a long line toward the beach, and began launching the rockets. From 0900 till 1000 hours all that could be hear was one long continuous rumbling roar coming from the island. By this time the first assault wave had almost reached the beach, the LCI's ceased their fire, and the first wave landed on Leyte against only slight opposition. The initial landings were made by the 7th and 24th Infantry Division, and the 1st Cavalry Divisions. It was the plan for the Leyte operation to have three Technical Intelligence field units with the combat troops. They were organized along the lines of the first composite unit that participated in the Hollandia operation. Each unit was attached to a division and was composed of teams of all -- or nearly all -- of the services. Complete coverage of the designated combat sector, and coordination in administration and operation were thus assured Late in September, Technical Intelligence Unit No. 1 was placed on temporary duty with the 24th Infantry Division at Hollandia to stage for the Leyte operation. This Unit was composed of Engineer Team No. 4, Ordnance Team No. 1, and a Signal Team. Leyte was the first operation for the Signal Team, composed of personnel recently assigned to the 5250th. During staging, members of Technical Intelligence Unit No. 1 met with the AC of S, G-2, of the Division, to whom they were attached with members of ATIS, MEIU No. 1, and the CIC team. A complete briefing, methods of working together, priority in the collection of enemy equipment, etc., were thoroughly covered. As MEIU had the best facilities for rapid dissemination of information to the combat troops, it was decided that they would first call on all explosive material captured. The Technical Intelligence Ordnance Team would get next highest priority. Plans were made for the Unit to go ashore in the second wave. It became a standard policy throughout the rest of the war for Technical Intelligence teams to go in early -- within one hour if possible -- after the first wave landed, to prevent troops from souveniring valuable equipment, thus destroying its usefulness for Technical Intelligence. During staging, the Unit checked team and individual equipment, and drew replacements for shortages. At 1800 hours, 13 October, the Unit sailed with the convoy from Hollandia to Leyte. The United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot was the nerve center for Technical Intelligence activities. It was administered directly under the control of G-2, USASOS, with each service operating an analysis section under the technical supervision of its respective service chief. Technical Intelligence units preparing for operations staged at the Depot and upon termination of duty in the field returned there, where the personnel were integrated into the analysis section staff. All equipment and material recovered by the teams was brough or sent to the Technical Intelligence Depot for study and research. Shipping from the Depot at Finschhafen to the united States improved considerably during October, November and December. Shipping from outlying bases was slow. A quanitty of equipment particularly Signal Corps and Ordnance material was received from New Guinea operations, Biak, Sansapor and Moratai, and as a result of the rapid advance of United States troops during January and February on Leyte, an unusually large quantity from all the services was recovered. At the same time a steady stream of small items confiscated by base censors and base Intelligence officers flowed in. Japanese aircraft equipment shipped from Aitape and other New Guinea bases was transshipped to Air Technical Intelligence, Far East Air Force, for disposition. Some confusion in the handling of name plates was evident. The War Department had directed that all nameplates should be mailed to the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, Washington, D.C., but the Chiefs of Services prohibited the removal of nameplates from equipment to be shipped to the United States. However, Technical and economic warfare Intelligence requirements could both be satisfied by double distribution of nameplate information and therefore, the following procedure went into effect: nameplates received from Technical Intelligence teams, Analysis Sections or postal censors, unless cleared by the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section with the task forces, were forwarded to the AC of S, G-2, Hq. USASOS, Army Service Forces, Washington. Nameplates of extreme technical significance, integral parts of the equipment, were photographed or duplicated by rubbings, and the prints, negatives or rubbings mailed to Army Service Forces, Washington. Throughout this period nameplates and operating instruction panels were received regularly in quantity from Technical Intelligence teams in the field and from postal censors. Preliminary translations were rendered for the benefit of the analysis sections and the plates were then transmitted directly to the United States. In view of comments from consignees in the United States, packing and crating of equipment for shipment was conducted with greater care for durability. Additional precautions were taken to insure adequate labeling of crates and inclosing of sufficient copies of vouchers and packing lists to facilitate recognition of equipment and acknowledgement of receipt. With the opening of the Luzon operation, steps were taken to close down the Depot at Finschhafen and to prepare to move the entire shipping and receiving sections and six analysis laboratories (except for a rear-echelon force) to Manila, Luzon, Philipine Islands, when it should be taken. In the meantime, team personnel remaining at the Depot were trained under supervision of team commanders with the assistance of analysis section chiefs, while analysis section personnel were occupied principally with writing technical reports and disposing of captured equipment on hand in preparation for the contemplated move. They crated equipment that would be needed and as additional tools and instruments were acquired, chests were constructed, labeled and stored. Only the minimum requirements in tools were retained in the shops as operating equipment. Personnel from the various analysis sections made a trip to Sio, New Guinea, to obtain enemy material which had been left there by the Japanese approximately ten months before. British Civil Affairs units were of great assistance in this operation. Eighteen Eighth Army Technical Inteeligence officers and men moved forward by air during January to join units in the field. Vehicles and equipment of these teams were safehanded later when shipping space was available. The Assistant Coordinator of Technical Intelligence, USASOS, and the Ordnance Intelligence officer, same Headquarters, visited the Technical Intelligence Depot in January to expedite forward movement of Technical Intelligence teams. They brought with them a shipment of speed graphic cameras for use in the field and in the sections, to facilitate preparation of technical reports. Operations at the Technical Intelligence Depot, Finschhafen, ceased on 28 February 1945. All analysis and organizational equipment was readied for immediate shipment to the new depot area in Manila. Loading commenced 6 March and the detachment was scheduled to sail 12 March. The closing of the Technical Intelligence Depot necessitated turning over approximately thirty-five tons of captured equipment to the Ordnance Officer, Base "F". Complete arrangements were made for expediting the loading of this equipment by the first available water transportation. Captain Thomas, Office of the Assistant Executive S-2, Base "F", served as captured material officer at the Base had been shipped. It was anticipated that receipts of enemy equipment at Base "F" would continue for one or two months while the new Depot was getting established in Manila. A total of 68 officers and 139 enlisted men were on detached service, during February to the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional). Of these, nine Technical Intelligence units, composed of 36 officers and 60 enlisted men, were on temporary duty to the Sixth Army and three Technical Intelligence units, composed of 16 officers and 27 enlisted men, were on temporary duty to the Eighth Army. Additional Technical Intelligence teams which had been staging, sailed for forward areas from Base "F" before movement of the Depot. The Headquarters of the united States Army Technical Intelligence Depot, composed of 8 officers and 38 enlised men, departed from Finschhafen, New Guinea, for Manila, Luzon, Philippine Islands, on 12 March. With the movement of the Depot to Manila and the transfer there of Headquarters USASOS, that city became the hub of Technical Intelligence activities in the Pacific theator. Technical Intelligence in the Western Pacific area had come of age and was operating more efficiently than at any previous time. Technical Intelligence on Luzon after February 1945 began to slow down. All the previously discussed Field Units -- had been relieved from field duty by March and returned to the Technical Intelligence Depot for duty with analysis sections. Field Unit No. 5, however, remained on operations with XIV Corps. Three other units were also in the field after March: Field Unit No. 4, which had participated in the original Luzon Landings, assigned to I Corps; Field Unit No. 8, new in the field, also assigned to I Corps; and Field Unit No. 9, newly assigned to XI Corps. Headquarters Sixth Army, located at San Fernando, Pampanga Province, instituted an extensive training course on enemy equipment for its troops during the month of May. Altogether, nine Technical Intelligence teams, designated as "Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction Teams", participated in this program, conducted under the direction of the AC of S, G-3. In addition to Units that were in the field during April, and the Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction teams, there were added two individual teams operating directly under Sixth Army G-2 on special assignments. Instead of being confined to certain sectors, these teams covered all areas occupied by Sixth Army combat units on Luzon. To assist the guerrilla forces in Northern Luzon in locating, collecting and repairing items of equipment, T/3 Lischalk and Pvt Thevenot, Ordnance technicians, functioned as an Enemy Weapons Team working directly under the Special Intelligence Section, Sixth Army Headquarters. Pvt Thevenot was hospialized some time later, but Sgt. Lischalk, aided by his team conducted training in the field, and continued to supply the troops with weapons and ammunition. Due to his work, considerably quantities of Japanese Ordnance material were utilized by the guerillas in the Northern Luzon area. The other special team was a JAPLAT Team consisting of T/Sgt Horton and Sgt Branigan which worked directly out of Sixth Army Headquarters and was assigned to the collection of JAPLAT, code name for nameplates and rubbings from captured equipment. Of the seven original Field Units that had launched the operations in Southern Luzon only Field Units 4 and 5 remained in the field during March and April. The rest were returned to the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot and were replaced by Field Units 8 and 9. Field Unit No. 8 left Finschhafen on 5 March 1945 just before the Depot closed in preparation for the transfer to Manila. As the Unit was new in the field, it operated in conjunction with Field Unit No. 4 until the end of March, and as in the case of new personnel, a good deal of its time was absorbed at first in becoming familiar with field operations in preparation for future assignments. Field Unit No. 8, acting upon instruction of G-2, I Corps operated with the 32d and 25th Divisions in the Villa Verde Trail and Balete Pass areas of Northern Luzon from 24 March on through April. In addition to their regular duties, all sections of this Unit cooperated to collect numerous items of enemy equipment to be added to the I Corps Information and Education Center's display. CWS Team No. 13 of this Unit had spent considerable time contacting the Chemical Warfare Officers of I Corps, including division officers, in order to concur with the new procedure of operation for CWS Technical Intelligence teams as directed by the Chemical officers of Sixth Army and I Corps. Engineer Team No. 6 found a considerable quantity of mines and booby traps. They were called upon to familiarize the troops with the equipment and to submit reports which were published by G-2 for the interest of all concerned. Later in May they were called in to Sixth Army Headquarters to assist in the Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction Teams' training program. The medical officer, operated in conjunction with Field Units 4 and 5, in the I Corps sector. Samples of 195 Japanese medicinals and laboratory reagents were recovered, together with samples of Japanese medical, surgical, dental and X-Ray equipment recovered from around Baguio. The medical office also identified the enemy drugs stored at PCAU hospitals within the I Corps sector to permit their use by PCAU physicians. Ordnance Team No. 9 recovered a considerable amount of enemy ordnance, involving several aircraft machine guns which had been used in ground combat. Some of this equipment was turned into a collecting company. Many of these repaired Japanese machine guns were turned on the enemy by United States and Philippine Army units in later battles. The quartermaster section had little luck recovering equipment as no enemy dumps of quartermaster significance were captured along the Ville Verde Trail or in the Balete Pass areas, though miscellaneous items were recovered. Due to the limited activity concerning enemy quartermaster items, members of this team devoted much of their time to assisting the Ordnance Team. However, some research on United States Quatermaster items was completed. T.I. Field Unit No. 9 was attached to XI Corps operating in the central Luzon sector. All six services comprised the teams of the Unit. CWS Intelligence Team No. 14 covering the 28th and 43d Division areas found some new equipment. Good examples of Japanese heavy Engineer equipment were located by Engineer Team No. 6. The Medical officer recovered some Medical material from a large supply dump; a microscope, an anesthesia machine, alcohol, miscellaneous bandages and dressings, lysol, a dental kit, a water purifier, and assorted quantities of drugs and medicines. Non-expendable items were processed through the Technical Intelligence Depot. Several types of heavy equipment were recovered by Ordnance Team No. 8 and Ordnance Team No. 7. This included a 15 cm self-propelled mount, a 70 mm battalion howitzer, a 75 mm gun, a truck and all types of ammunition. Two type 97 Jap tanks mounting 47 mm guns were found. During March and April, several changes in personnel were made within this team and the two Ordnance teams were combined as Ordnance Team No. 7 with Lt. Abbott in charge. In May, Cpl. Smallwood returned to the Technical Intelligence Depot but Lt Abbott and One EM reported to Sixth Army Headquarters as one of the Ordnance teams participating in the Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction training program. Many types of Quartermaster equipment were recovered by Quartermaster Team No. 6. As most of these had no Intelligence value, they were turned over to local salvage units for disposition. Signal Team No. 1 found that areas recently evacuated by the enemy yielded only small amounts of Signal equipment. Therefore, in June, the 2 man team covered operations and one returned to the depot and the other was assigned to Sixth Army Headquarters as Signal Team No. 1 in the Enemy Equipment and Material Instruction program. Sixth Army operations in central and northern Luzon during May moved slowly but steadily forward. East of Manila, where the enemy was strongly entrenched, their resistance was stubborn. Ipo and Jawa Dams, which controlled the Manila water supply, were secured intact, however, and the Japanese forces here, as well as in Southern Luzon, were encircled and reduced to remnants by June. In the north, Baguio fell, and though the Japs staged strong counter-attacks against United States forces along the Villa Verde Trail, they were pushed back from their cave positions along Balete Ridge, and Balete Pass itself was taken. At the beginning of June, the Cagayan Valley was the only large area in Luzon remaining in enemy hands. A combined American and Philippine force closed in on Aparri, at the northern end of the Cagayan Valley and secured the town without opposition on 21 June. Meanwhile, Sixth Army forces had made pincer drives from Balete Pass at the southern end of the Valley northwest along Highway No. 4 and northeast along Highway No. 5. On 26 June, near Alcala, Sixth Army's 37th Division made contact with leading elements of the 511th Parachute Infantry which had advanced south along Highway No. 5 following an airborne invasion near Aparri. This junction effectively secured the entire length of the Cagayan Valley. From then to the close of the Luzon operations, which was terminated by the end of the war, fighting consisted mainly in liquidating pockets of enemy resistance which had been bypassed. Headquarters 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional) and the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot arrived at Manila, Philippine Islands, from Finschafen, New Guinea, on 26 March 1945. Major Manley, Commanding Officer of the Company, had preceded the organization forward, arriving in Manila 12 March to select a site for the Headquarters. Specifications for the locations were that it contain housing, messsing, and recreational facilities for approximately 90 officers and 185 enlisted men (72 Technical Intelligence teams), as well as shop space for analysis laboratories for each of the six services, room for the shipping and receiving department, and sufficient ground space for a motor THE WILLIAM L. HOWARD ORDNANCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM e-mail wlhoward@gte.net Telephone AC 813 585-7756 ****************************************************** MYSTERY RADIO; Navy AMA, by Dennis Starks While it is relatively common to find Army Signal Corps type radios in the hands of the Navy/Marine Corp. Two things, both somewhat rare, serve to confuse us. The first, and most common, is the existence of Signal Corps equipment that is painted simi-gloss haze gray rather than the regular Olive Drab. These examples are in every respect a Signal Corp set, right down to the data plate. We can only speculate as to the different color, and why, or that these radio sets were indeed even meant for Navy use. To date the only equipment to be encountered in this condition are the BC-1000, BC-620, and BC-659, and they are far more rare than their Olive Drab counterparts. One rumor has it, that these Haze gray Signal Corps radios were supplied to resistance groups prior to the "D" Day invasion, that their color was altered to prevent their users from being accused of stealing them. But this story is completely unfounded besides being very shaky. Actually it sounds more like a sales pitch than history. Another possibility would place these radios in use by rear echelon personnel such as Shore Patrol or other security forces. While this is certainly a more plausible answer, it too will not hold water especially when the AMA inters the picture. Then we have the second variant, here a Signal Corps set is not only painted Haze Gray, but also has a Navy data plate, and designation. Inter the AMA! The AMA is in every respect identical to the Signal Corps BC-721 except for it's color of Haze Gray, and Navy data plate. Whatsa BC-721 you ask? The BC-721 is a modification of a BC-611F that allows it's use in a special rack while aboard a glider. Rather than the standard audio jacks in it's bottom cover, the 721 is provided with an eight pin Jones connector, it also has a sliding door that allows connection to an external antenna that is not found on the standard BC-611. The game plan of the BC-721/AMA was for it to supply communications between the pilot of a glider, and the towing aircraft. Once the controlled crash was completed, the BC-721 could be removed from the wreckage, and used on the ground as a standard BC-611(if anyone survived ). It is very doubtful that the AMA ever saw any wartime service, or at least in the above capacity, particularly in light of the very short lived history of Para-Marines, and their area of operations which would have ruled out the use of gliders from the start. If indeed the AMA had the same role in life as the BC-721 to begin with. Is it possible the Navy had a different intended use for the set? Note it's AMA designation that would tend to indicated aircraft use. Could it have been intended to fill a similar role as the RCA AVT/AVR series? Here we have a very small aircraft radio set that we know had two main uses. The first as a cheap, small, easily installed, operated, and removed radio set, it was installed in newly manufactured aircrafts of all types right off the assembly line. This to provide it's pilot with a temporary means of communications while the aircraft was flown/delivered to it's destination. The pilot mainly just needed to communicate a very short distance, with the destination control tower, to get landing instructions. Because of this application, the AVT/AVR series were commonly referred to as "Delivery Radios". The second, and more glorious role the AVT/AVR series was as a liaison radio in very small spotter aircraft. Here the aircraft was so small it had no electrical system of it's own. The radio equipment was either powered by a small wind generator mounted under the fuselage(as with the AVT/AVR), or dry batteries contained in normally backpack ground radios as we have already seen with the BC-620/1000, RT-70, PRC-10,25 etc. If this possibility is compared with the excellent account given in the reference below of the evolution of controlled Naval, and Artillery gunfire, maybe we have the AMA's true intended purpose. It certainly would have presented some advantages in either of the above applications. But we don't know, and I'm just guessing. What do you think? Shit! Have I just written an article about Aircraft Crap? Heaven forbid! We are left with the questions; with the production fascilities at home bogged down to the max already, why bother stopping the line just to change colors on an extremely common radio? Or with the supply, and logistics problems already almost insurmountable, why further complecate the system with a completely new number for a radio that already existed, or one that's simply a deferent color? Today, of the Signal Corps type radios encountered, their Haze Gray counterparts are far more rare than the Olive Drab. While Navy field type equipment in general is harder to find than Signal Corps types, the AMA remains one of the rarist with only one known to have survived. Currently known Haze Gray Signal Corps radios in the hands of collectors include 2ea BC-1000(one in my collection), 1ea BC-620, and 1ea BC-659. While this count can by no means be complete. The point is to show in comparison the hundreds of OD sets I know of in the hands of friends, this is all the Gray variants. The next radio to be featured as a Mystery Radio is the Marine Corps PRR-15, after that no candidates have as yet been nominated. If you have any input at all, either with this article, or future ones, please let me know. Dennis Starks; MILITARY RADIO COLLECTOR/HISTORIAN military-radio-guy@juno.com Referance; Military Collector Group Post, Dec.20/97 Evolution of Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine; an Essay, by Brian Scace ****************************************************** HUMOR; The teacher asked her students to use the word "fascinate" in a sentence. Mary said, "My family went to the New York City Zoo, and we saw all the animals. It was fascinating." The teacher said, "That was good, but I wanted the word "fascinate." Sally raised her hand. She said, "My family went to the Philadelphia Zoo and saw the animals. I was fascinated." The teacher said, "Good, but Iwanted the word "fascinate." Little Johnny raised his hand. The teacher hesitated because Johnny was noted for his bad language. She finally decided there was no way he could damage the word "fascinate" so she called on him. Johnny said, "My sister has a sweater with 10 buttons, but her tits are so big, she can only "fasten 8." ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- End forwarded message ---------- When finished reading use browser back button or go to http://www.prc68.com/MCGP/MCGP.html